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Pursuant

to Rule

24(c) of thq Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, Appellants (Homeowners), suing derivatively on behalf of
the American Towers Homeowners Association, file this Reply Brief.
INTRODUCTION
In their Responding Brief, much as they did in the court
below, Appellees (the Trustees) frame the issues in what appears to
be a studied effort to confuse and deflect the Court's attention
from the complexity of the issues before it. On appeal, Homeowners
challenge solely, whether, in light of the facts contained in their
Complaint, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing
the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Were this simply an issue governed by the four corners

of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act (Nonprofit Act), Utah Code
Ann.

§ 16-6-54 through § 16-6-112 (1995 & Supp. 1996), as the

Trustees claim, there would be no issue for appeal.
case

involves

significant

condominium

owners.

impression

regarding

This

issues
case

the correct

impacting

raises

However, this

the

a question

interpretation

of

rights

of

of

first

the

Utah

Condominium Act (Condominium Act or the Act) , Utah Code Ann. § 578-1

et. seq.

(1995 & Supp. 1996), and the rights and duties

conferred by the Condominium Act.1 Further, this case concerns the
proper application of settled contract principles to the unique

1

Just as a condominium is neither a house nor an apartment,
but falls somewhere in between, the law regarding a breach of a
condominium bylaw is neither solely nonprofit corporate law nor
solely for-profit corporate law -— but is a studied combination of
both.
1

circumstances relating to the proper operation and management of
condominium associations and boards,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court must accept the
material allegations of the complaint as true and consider those
allegations and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable
to the complainant.
624 (Utah 1990).

Colman Vt Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

only where the claimant would not be entitled to relief under the
facts alleged in the complaint "or under any state of fact they
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,
766 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).

This Court may affirm the trial

court's ruling only if it clearly appears, that as a matter of law,
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her

claims.

Educators Mutual Inst Ass'n Vt Allied Prppt & Cast Inst

£a, 890 p.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995); £££ Wright Vt University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah App. 1994).

To this end, this Court

has stated
[D]ismissal of a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the
liberality of notice pleading . . . When
challenging a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
the appellant is entitled to a generous

standard of review.
Wright 876 P.2d at 390 (Billings, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.r 815
P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991)).

Finally, the propriety of a

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal presents a question of law this Court
2

reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's
decision.

St. Benedict's Dev. Co, v. St. Benedict's H O S D , , 811

P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ASSOCIATION IS ORGANIZED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH
CONDOMINIUM ACT, § 57-8-1 et seq. AND IS SUPPLEMENTALLY
GOVERNED BY BOTH THE REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT,
S 16-10a-101 to -1705 AND THE UTAH NONPROFIT CORPORATION
ACT, § 16-6-54 to -112.
In Point I of their Brief, the Trustees erroneously contend

the Nonprofit Act is dispositive of Homeowners' claims in this
case.

Rather, it is the Condominium Act, acting in concert with

all other relevant law, that governs this case and is therefore
dispositive of Homeowners' claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1)
(1995) .
In relevant part, the Condominium Act provides
(1) The provisions of this act shall be
in addition and supplemental to all other
provisions of law, statutorily or judicially
declared, provided that where the application
of the provisions of this act conflict with
the application of such other provisions, illis

act shall prevailId. (emphasis added).

The American Towers Homeowners Association

(the Association) has expressly incorporated the Condominium Act
into its Declaration and Bylaws.

See Article X § 10.07 (R. 67);

Article I § 1.14 (R. 56); Article XX § 20.02 (R. 85); see also
Homeowners' Opening Brief at 32-33.

Undisputedly, the Condominium

Act governs Homeowners' claims.
Recognizing the inescapable application of the Condominium Act
to the facts alleged in the instant case, the Trustees contend that
3

while the Act ^primarily governs the instant action, because it
contains no requisite standard of care for the elected officers and
directors of the Association's Board of Trustees, the court must
look to the Nonprofit Act for guidance. The Trustees read too much
into the Condominium Act and erroneously overstate the Condominium
Act's terms.
It is clear, and the Trustees concede, § 57-8-35(1) contains
no specifications regarding what "other provisions of law" shall
supplement the Condominium Act.

Certainly the legislature intended

the Condominium Act be read in harmony with other law, however, the
legislature failed to provide which law(s) should apply.
least

arguable, and

likewise

intended

indeed

compelling, that the

the Utah Revised

Business

It is at

legislature

Corporation

Act

(Business Act) to be considered when interpreting the Condominium
Act.

See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-101 to -1750 (1995).
A fundamental tenet of statutory construction provides that

when there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application
of a statute, courts must analyze the statute in its entirety, in
light of its objectives, and harmonize the statute with legislative
intent and purpose.
104 5 (Utah 1991).

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037,
Read as a whole, the Condominium Act neither

expressly refers to nor relies upon the Nonprofit Act.

Further,

when harmonizing the full text of § 57-8-35, the section in
controversy, the language of this section suggests it relates to
such "other provisions of law" regarding
approval, and recording of plats —

4

the zoning, development,
property

law, not civil

liability, statutes.2

Finally, when laying the Nonprofit Act and

the Condominium Act side-by-side, there is far more discord than
harmony among the separate acts.3
Certainly, there are differences between the Condominium Act
and the Nonprofit Act.

And, in part, those differences are

2

Section 57-8-35(1) expressly refers to Utah Code Ann. §§ 109-25(regarding municipal land use and development); 10-9-26 (same);
17-21-8 (regarding recording and approval of maps and plats); 1727-21 (regarding county land use and development); and 57-5-3
(regarding plats and subdivisions). Subsections (2), (3), and (4)
all relate to future development, zoning, and compliance with
municipal and county property ordinances.
3

In relevant part: (1) The Condominium Act governs the
collective ownership and possession of fee simple property. See
Id. §§ 57-8-6, -7. The Nonprofit Act makes no mention of real
property rights or condominium associations. See Id. § 16-16-108
(term "cooperative association" refers to agricultural cooperative
not condominiums; § 16-6-21 (includes no reference to the
Condominium Act, condominiums, or condominium associations in
exhaustive list of statute's purposes); (2) The Condominium Act
mandates that condominium associations create declarations and
bylaws, to be executed and acknowledged by all owners and lessees
and duly recorded, and that each owner shall strictly comply with
the bylaws. See Id. §§ 57-8-8, -10, -12, -16. The Nonprofit Act
does not require bylaws. See; id. § 16-6-44. (3) The Condominium
Act provides "common profits of the property shall be distributed
to . . . the unit owners according to their respective percentage
of fractional undivided interests . . .." Id. § 57-9-24. The
Nonprofit Act regards only "corporations] which [do] not
distribute any part of its income to its members, trustees, or
officers . . . ." j^L. § 16-6-19(11), and "[n]o part of the net
earnings of a nonprofit corporation may inure to or for the benefit
of or be distributable to the corporations1 members . . . ." Id.
§ 16-6-42.
With respect to (3), on page 11 of their Brief, the Trustees
contend "Homeowners have never alleged that this Association
distributes profits to members, trustees, or officers," and
therefore the instant Association must be a nonprofit corporation.
This is a distinction without a difference. Simply because the
Association, up to this point, has not distributed its profits does
not foreclose the fact that the Association may do so in the future
or that, in this regard, the Association is much more akin to a far
profit corporation than a nonprofit corporation.
5

material and extreme.
courts —

The state legislature did not intend for

such as the lower court —

to harmonize such inapposite

statutory provisions to give effect to an ambiguous statute.
Rather, when "dealing with an unclear statute," —
35(1) —

such as § 57-8-

Utah courts must render interpretations that ""will best

promote the protection of the public. |W Cloverf

808 P.2d at 1045

(quoting Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, 575 P. 2d 1044, 1046 (Utah
1978)).

Reading too much into § 57-8-35(1) as the district court

did below and as the Trustees likewise urge this Court to do on
appeal, promotes the Trustees', not the public's interest, and
permits the Trustees to profit from their misdeeds.

Such reading

allows the Trustees to violate express covenants, conditions, and
bylaws of the Association.

Clearly, such an interpretation permits

acts that would violate the homeowners' interests.
In relevant part, the competing statutes ~

§ 16-6-107 of the

Nonprofit Act and § 16-10a-840 of the Business Act —

provide:

(1) A trustee or officer of a nonprofit
corporation is not personally liable to the
corporation or its members for civil claims
arising from acts or omissions made in the
performance of his duties as a trustee or
officer, unless the acts or omissions are the
result of his intentional misconduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
(4) A director or officer is not liable
to the corporation, its shareholders, or any
conservator or receiver, or any assignees or
successor-in-interest thereof, for any action
taken, or any failure to take any action, as
an officer or director, as the case may be,
unless:
(a) the director or officer has
breached or failed to perform the

duties of the officer in compliance
with this section; and
(b) the breach or failure to
perform
constitutes
gross
negligence, willful misconduct, or
intentional infliction of harm on
the corporation or the shareholders.
Id, § 16-10a-840(4) (emphasis added).4
At the hearing on The Trustees1 Motion to Dismiss on August 9,
1996, the lower court expressly recognized the application of both
the Business and Nonprofit Acts to the facts in this case.

In

relevant part, the district court stated:
Under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act
it goes, if at all, to torts. But you have to

superimpose on that the Utah Condominium Actt
And it brings in the Utah General Business
Corporation Act.
The very fact [the
Association] put
in an
indemnification
provision in their Bylaws, there is no
indemnification
provision
in
the
Utah
Nonprofit Corporations Law. But when you sort
through this, it's not just the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act that controls here*
(R. 496-97).

The Trustees attempt to explain away this statement

in a brief footnote located on page 15 of their Brief.

Contrary to

The Trustees1 claim, the district court was not merely restating
Homeowners' argument, but was recognizing that § 57-8-35(1) is
ambiguous and that both the "Utah General Business Corporations Act"
and the "Utah Non-Profit Corporation Act" apply.

Indeed, the lower

4

Prior to May 3, 1993, the standard of care for directors and
officers was simple negligence. The substantive amendment changing
the standard of care to gross negligence is not retroactive,

Resort ion Trust Corpt yf Hess, 820 F. supp. 1359, 1364-67 (D. Utah
1993), and therefore acts which occurred before May 3, 1993,
including the February 11, 1993 closed-door meeting in which the
Trustees decided to misappropriate funds from the reserve fund, are
subject to the lower, simple negligence standard of care.

7

court expressly recognized the problem created by § 57-8-35's
ambiguity, yet, in derogation of legislative intent, the court went
on to state without explanation:
I don't think there is wisdom in
attempting to apply multiple acts and then
trying to determine from those acts- where
there could be a potential for a different
standard to be applied to Directors of
Nonprofit
Condominium
Associations
and
Nonprofit Corporations. . . .
•

• • •

So, Mr. Manning, your Motion to Dismiss
is Granted.
(R. 496-97).
In so ruling, the district court placed itself in the shoes of
the state legislature, ignored fundamental rules of statutory
construction, and without balancing the competing statues, declared
by judicial fiat the standard of care for condominium officers and

directors. £££ Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inct Vt
Frederick. 890 P. 2d 1017, 1024

(Utah 1995)

("The

Legislature

expects courts to apply statutes, . . . with some degree of common
sense to particular situation.

The Legislature does not expect

courts to effectuate what they think is good policy-")) (emphasis
added).

Reading § 57-8-35(1) as the lower court did compels absurd

results, results which contradict the lower courts own findings:
The district court recognized the ambiguity in § 57-8-3 5; the
district court recognized the relevant application of both the
Business Act and the Nonprofit Act; thus, the district court
recognized Homeowners had stated a claim —

under the bylaws and

the "Utah General Business Corporations Act"— upon which relief

8

could be granted.

Inexplicably, however, the district reversed

itself and dismissed Homeowners complaint in contravention of Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the court had applied, as it recognized it ought to, a
"gross negligence" standard of care, the allegations contained in
Homeowners' Complaint more than adequately state a claim for
relief.5

In part, Count IV alleges facts legally sufficient to

support a finding of "simple" negligence for the Trustees' pre-May
3, 1993 acts.

Count V alleges facts legally sufficient to support

a finding of "gross" negligence for the Trustees' post-May 3, 1993
ultra vires acts.

This Court should therefore reverse the lower

court's dismissal.6

In part "gross negligence" has been interpreted to mean "a
want of ordinary care and diligence." Warren v. Robison, 57 P.
287, 291 (Utah 1899).
Moreover, as this Court must, when
construing the instant Complaint in a light most favorable to
Homeowners1 and drawing all reasonable inferences in Homeowners'

favor, oisgn Vt Park-Craig-Qlson, Ingt, 815 p.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah
App. 1991), it is reasonable to infer Homeowners have alleged
conduct akin to an intentional and willful act. See Wright v.
University of Utah, 876 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah App. 1994) (Billings,
J. , dissenting) (finding that where plaintiff alleged employee
"assaulted and struck" her, it reasonable could be inferred
plaintiff claim both an intentional and negligent act).
6

In their Brief, the Trustees likewise contend the breach of
fiduciary duties and negligent management claims contained in
Homeowners' Complaint must fail as they too are based upon an
"intentional misconduct" standard of care. Again, the Trustees err.
Rather, when a homeowner volunteers to sit on a condominium
homeowner board, the homeowner assumes the fiduciary duties of
care, obedience, and diligence, which duties the homeowner breaches
by its negligent acts. Homeowners' Complaint sufficiently alleges
facts which show the Trustees breached these duties in the instant
case.

9

II.

TRUSTEES MUST STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE DECLARATION AND
BYLAWS AND THE OWNERS HAVE STANDING TO SUE FOR THEIR
FAILURE TO SO COMPLY.
A.

As
Owners,
Trustees
Obligated
to Strictly
Declaration and Bylaws.

are
Contractually
Comply
with the

The Trustees further contend Homeowners have failed to state
a upon which the court may find a breach of contract.

The Trustees

concede the condominium Bylaws, together with the Articles of
Incorporation and the members1 applications constitute a contract
between the members and the corporation.

Turner v. Hi-Country

Homeowner's Ass'nr 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996).

Conversely,

the Trustees argue that as individuals, the Trustees are not a
party to this contract and accordingly, may not be sued under it.
The Trustees claim the agreement to establish the Reserve
Account (which account the Trustees mismanaged) is between the
Association and the owners and that the Trustees had no part in
this

agreement.

As

a

general

principle,

a

condominium

association's declaration and bylaws form part of "an elaborate
contract among the individuals owning and sharing property in the
community."

P.M. Dunbar, The Homeowners Association Manual/ at 5-6

(2 ed. 1991) .

Under this contract, each owner is entitled to

"defend their contract rights and to resist efforts of those who
would impair or take them away . . . .
of the board of directors."

[including] arbitrary action

Id. (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the Trustees themselves are owners and
therefore parties to this "elaborate contract."

The Trustees are

also the elected officers and representatives of the collective
10

homeowners, charged with upholding their will.

It is untenable to

suggest, as the Trustees do, that once elected, the Trustees were
somehow released from their reciprocal duty (as owners) to strictly
comply with the contract.

Rather, once elected to serve as

trustees, the Trustees undertook a dual obligation (1) as owners,
to strictly comply with the Declaration and Bylaws (the contract),
(R. 83) , and (2) as agents, to carry out their duties consistent
with the rights and obligations contained in the Declaration and
Bylaws (the contract).

(R. 121). The Trustees cite no authority,

and indeed there is none, to support their claim that once elected,
they became relieved of their obligation to comply with the
contract.7

Because the Trustees are in the unique position of

being parties —

by virtue of their status as owners —

and agents

to the contract, they may be held liable and indeed sued for breach
of this contract.
Clearly, under Rules 8(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

and

pursuant

to

the Utah

Supreme

Court's

recent

pronouncement in Broadwater Vt Old Republic Surt, «54 P.2d 527, 536
7

In an attempt to avoid their obvious contractual liability
in this case, the Trustees assert that they, like any other "agent"
cannot be held individually liable for the contractual obligations
of their principle. The Trustees rely on the recent Utah Supreme
Court decision in Carlie v. MorganP 922 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1996), in
which the court held an implied warranty of habitability may not be
enforced against an agent who entered into a contract on behalf of
a disclosed principle. Carlie is distinguishable from the instant
case. First, Carlie concerns an implied term and not an express
contact. Next, the agent in Carlie had no stake in and was not
otherwise a party to the implied contract. Here, the Trustees are
both parties to the contract — they are owners as well as officers
— who have been elected by the other owners to enforce and uphold
the express contract terms. As such, the Trustees may be sued in
contract for their failure to do so.
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(Utah 1993), the same facts giving rise,to a tort claim, i.e., the
Trustees1 negligent mismanagement of the Reserve Account, may also
give rise to a separate contract claim.

Thus, even assuming

arguendo Homeowners' have not plead the appropriate tort standard
of care in this case, such failure cannot and shall not effect the
validity of Homeowners1 well-plead and legally cognizable contract
claims.

Accordingly, this Court must reverse the district court's

erroneous

dismissal

of Homeowners

contract

claims

and

allow

Homeowners to proceed to trial on those issues.
B.

The Trustees Are Bound to Strictly Comply with
Declaration and Bylaws.

In support of their contention that the individual trustees
may not be sued in contract, the Trustees claim that neither the
text of the Declaration and Bylaws nor Utah law dictate that they
"strictly

comply" with the "contract."

In so claiming, the

Trustees again oversimplify the issues in this case and distort the
reality regarding their status both as owners and agents.
Court must be wary to accept such broad-sweeping claims —

This
which

claims the Trustees predicate on generalized contract principles
with no application, or only limited application, to the law
regarding condominium associations.

See Booneville Properties,

Inc. v. Simons, 677 P.2d 1111, 1112 (Utah 1984) (holding that where
association has adopted

internal rules and regulations which

members have agreed to be governed by, controversies arising
therein shall be determined by internal rules and not general
contract law).

Homeowners have not made this mistake.

Rather,

Homeowners Opening Brief is squarely premised upon the Declaration
12

and Bylaws and the difficult and evolving principles of law
regarding condominiums.
In part, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-8 and Article XVIII Section
18.01 of the Declaration refer to owners, not trustees.

(R. 83).

However, as stated herein, with regard to condominium associations
in which the governing board is comprised of homeowners, this is a
distinction

without

a difference.

Both

the

Utah

Code

Declaration set forth the reciprocal duty of all homeowners

and
—

including the Trustees in this case, who have been elected from the
pool of homeowners to serve those homeowners' interests.

As

owners, the Trustees are independently held to a duty of "strict
compliance"

with

the

Declaration and Bylaws.

Condominium

Act

and

the

Associations'

The Trustees dual-status as trustees and

owners does not extinguish this duty.
more all the more relevant.

Indeed, it makes the duty

See e.g. f Badger v. Madsen, 896 P. 2d

20, 23 (Utah App. 1995) (stating courts require strict compliance
where

failure to adhere to contract requirement will effect

substantive rights and result in possible prejudice.)
Homeowners
failure

Complaint

sufficiently

alleges

the

Trustees'

to strictly adhere to the requirements of the Utah Code

and the Association's Declaration and Bylaws.

The Complaint

therefore states an enforceable claim for breach of contract.
Accordingly, this Court must reverse the district court's erroneous
dismissal of Homeowners' Complaint.8
8

In a further effort to defeat their clear contractual
obligations, the Trustees contend in their Brief to this Court,
that even if they are bound to a duty of strict compliance, the
13

C.

The Trustees Committed Numerous Ultra Vires
Acts for Which Homeowners are Entitled to
Relief Under Both the Business Act and the
Nonprofit Act.

In their Brief, the Trustees argue that if they are guilty of
anything, they are guilty only of intra

vires

were authorized, but imperfectly executed.

acts —

acts which

As such, the Trustees

contend that Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23, which expressly permits the
instant action, has no bearing on this case.
It is settled that an ultra
the

actor's authority

intentional or not.

Ultra

—

vires

act is an act that exceeds

regardless of whether
vires

the

act was

acts include not only acts "wholly

beyond the scope of the authority of the corporation, but also
[acts] apparently within the scope of authority but actually, in
the particular case, for a purpose not within the authority of the
corporation."

William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law

of Private Corporations § 3550 (Perm. ed. 1989) ; see also Black's
Law Dictionary 1365 (5th ed. 1979) ("The term [ultra

vires]

has a

Trustees have strictly complied in this case.
In part, the
Trustees argue that because Article XIX Section 19.05 of the
Declaration does not specifically prohibit Trustees from diverting
funds from the reserve account to finance expensive litigation,
that section gives them the necessary discretion to act as they did
in this case. The text of the Declaration, however, is to the
contrary. (R. 84). Article X Section 10.03, states in relevant
part, "[T]he Association may acquire and pay for out of the Common
Expense Fund" — not the Reserve Account — "legal and accounting
services necessary or desirable in connection with the operation of
the Project or the enforcement of this Declaration."
(R. 67)
Certainly, the Trustees1 use of the Reserve Account in this case
contravenes the Declaration's clear directives and therefore, even
if Trustees were entitled to exercise some degree of discretion —
which they are not — in obtaining such legal services, they abused
this discretion in this case. Moreover, the Trustees failed to
obtain homeowner consent.
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broad application and includes not only acts prohibited by the
charter, but acts which are in excess of powers granted and not
prohibited, and generally applie[s] . . . when the corporation has
the power but exercises it irregularly") . The Trustees claim that
because the Association, acting through the Trustees, has the power
to

sue

and

be

sued,

" [t]here can be no question

prosecution of the CCI Litigation was authorized."

that the

In fact, the

Trustees devote more than four pages of their brief to their tilted
argument regarding the Trustees authority to act imperfectly as
they did in this case.
Certainly the Association has the authority to sue.
Homeowners do not contend otherwise.
this

case

—

understand —
litigation.

which

contention

Further,

What Homeowners contest in

the Trustees

clearly

do

not

is the manner in which the Trustees pursued this
It is not disputed that the Trustees could have

resorted to legal action to resolve the plumbing problems in this
case.

It is, however, disputed that the Trustees could divert and

misappropriate funds, all while acting in secret, to pursue this
legal action.
sued.

Clearly, the Trustees have authority to sue and be

Clearer still, the manner in which the Trustees "sued" in

this particular case, was in excess of the powers granted them and
therefore "not within" the Trustees1 authority.
The Trustees had no authority to go outside the express terms
of the Declaration and Bylaws.

The Trustees had no authority to

authorize and fund from the Reserve Account an enormous and illfated litigation expenditure.

The Trustees had no authority to
15

repeatedly disregard the pleas and complaints from their neighbors,
the homeowners whom they were elected to serve, regarding this
diversion of funds.

Finally, the Trustees had no authority to

attempt to correct their misdeeds by foisting a special assessment
on the collective owners after the owners had soundly defeated this
"assessment."

In the face of these, and numerous other egregious

indiscretions, see Opening Brief at pp. 27-28, the Trustees claim
that

fl

[t]here can be no question" but that the Trustees were

authorized

to

divert

funds

from

the

Reserve

Account,

is

unfathomable.
The Trustees acted completely without authority in this case.
They repeatedly engaged in ultra

vires

conduct for which Homeowners

are entitled to relief. Viewing Homeowners1 Complaint in the light
most favorable to Homeowners, this Court must reverse the district
court's order of dismissal.9

9

Finally, in response to Point VI of the Trustees' Brief,
Homeowners would agree the district court's "speculation" is
irrelevant. Indeed, it is because the speculation was irrelevant
and wholly outside the proceedings then before the court that the
district court erred. As set forth in the Opening Brief, it was
irrelevant for the lower court to "speculate" on issues and
scenarios not raised in Homeowners1 Complaint and therefore not
before the court. Further, it was error for the court to then use
that speculation as a basis for dismissing Homeowners' Complaint.
The lower court's speculation gave rise to an arbitrary denial of
Homeowners' claim for relief which this Court must reverse. See In
re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996) (stating where trial
court relied on its own "policy" to deny plaintiff's request for a
name change, decision was based "purely on "unsupported
generalizations and speculation'" and constituted an arbitrary
denial of claim for relief).
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CONCLPSION

Pursuant to Rule 8(a), 8(e) and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Homeowners1 Complaint alleges sufficient facts,
which taken as true, reasonably and adequately support a claim upon
which

relief

can be granted.

The district

court erred

in

dismissing this Complaint based upon speculation and conjecture and
an inappropriate application of the law.

In relevant part,

Homeowners have plead sufficient facts to support both their tort
and contract claims, as well as the Homeowners' entitlement to
attorney fees.

Therefore, Homeowners request that this Court

reverse the lower court's order dismissing their Complaint, remand
this case for further proceedings, and permit Homeowners their day
in court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L> I

day of July, 1997.

CAMPBELL, M^ACK & SESSIONS.

E. BARNEY GESAS
BRIDGET K. ROMANO
Attorneys for Appellants
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